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The court of appeals looked to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc., _ U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d. 593, reh'g denied, _
U.S.
115 S.Ct. 23, 129 L.Ed.2d. 922 (1994) for the appropriate standard to evaluate the
constitutionality of the injunction. The Madsen case, decided after the district court decision, held
that a more stringent test of constitutionality is appropriate when an injunction rather than a
statute is at issue. Thus the traditional test applied to content-neutral regulations of time, place,
and manner of expression was rejected by the Madsen Court for injunctions. In its place, the
Supreme Court stated that the test for injunctions is whether they "burden no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest." 114 S.Ct. at 2525.
__,

Under both the traditional and the new Madsen tests, the question whether the regulation
or injunction is content-neutral is a threshold issue. An injunction will be found not to be
content-neutral if it makes "reference to the content of the regulated speech." Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989). The en banc court of
appeals, drawing an analogy with Madsen, concluded that the preliminary injunction was in fact
content-neutral. "In the instant case, as in Madsen, the injunction's purpose is both content- and
viewpoint-neutral: the court imposed restrictions on the demonstrators not to suppress their
anti-abortion message but 'incidental to their antiabortion message because they repeatedly
violated the court's original order."'
Applying the Madsen test, the court of appeals examined the three significant
governmental interests that were identified by the district court and found that these interests
closely approximated the significant governmental interests noted in Madsen. The first interest
involved the need for the government to ensure the maximum medical safety for the patient
undergoing an abortion procedure. Additionally, there was a government interest in protecting
the safety of the public from traffic or crowd control problems near clinics during protests. The
third interest, access to abortions, was grounded in the "woman's freedom to seek lawful medical
or counseling services."
Having determined that there were three significant government interests at stake, the
court of appeals next turned to the question of whether the contested provisions of the injunction
"burdened more speech than necessary." First, the court found that the fifteen foot buffer zone
provision was narrowly tailored to protect the government interests concerning access to
abortions and ensuring medical safety for clients, while not impeding the free speech of the
protestors.
The court relied on the findings of the district court that harassment from the
protesters' close range tactics produced negative effects on the health and well-being of patients,
as well as interfered with the normal functioning of the clinic.
Next, the court turned to the "cease and desist" provision, distinguishing this provision
from a similar one ruled unconstitutional in the Madsen case. In Madsen, the provision at issue
did not allow protesters to approach patients within three hundred feet of the clinic unless the
patient initiated the communication. In the case at bar, however, the "cease and desist" provision
enabled protesters to initiate counseling with patients even within the fifteen feet buffer zone
unless or until the patient affirmatively rejected such communication. Thus, the court of appeals
upheld the provision, finding that it did not unnecessarily burden the speech of the protesters.

